Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market allocation that prima facie seems anticompetitive? We introduce a model in which service providers aim at optimizing the number of customers who use their services, while customers aim at choosing service providers with minimal customer load. Each service provider chooses between a variety of levels of service, and as long as it does not lose customers, aims at minimizing its level of service; the minimum level of service required to satisfy a customer varies across customers. We consider a two-stage competition, in the first stage of which the service providers select their levels of service, and in the second stage -customers choose between the service providers.
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Setting 1.1.1. Shoppers. Consider the downtown area of the fictional city of Metropolis, the wine capital of the world. At its heart lies Metropolis Central Station. Every morning, shoppers from throughout the Metropolis metropolitan area (and beyond) disembark the train at Metropolis Central, at the vicinity of which many wine shops are located, and go about their wine-shopping errands. Each shopper is interested in purchasing a single bottle of wine, and is willing to walk at most d minutes (a shopper-dependant real value) in each direction in order to get it. Assume for the time being that the qualities of the various wines available on the market are indistinguishable (or alternatively, that our shoppers do not care about the quality of the wine that they get); we remove this assumption in Section 1.1.4 below. Therefore, each shopper's sole consideration is that the bottle of wine that she buys be as exclusive as possible, i.e. she prefers to get her wine at the shop that sells the fewest bottles of wine throughout the day (so that it can be considered a "boutique wine"), as long as it is no more than d minutes away from Metropolis Central, of course. A Nash equilibrium among the shoppers is therefore an assignment of the shoppers to shops, s.t. for each shopper with walkingtime limit d, no shop exists within d walking minutes of Metropolis Central that sells fewer bottles of wine throughout the day than the shop assigned to this shopper.
We consider a scenario with finitely-many shops and continuously-many shoppers, 2 Y. A. Gonczarowski and M. Tennenholtz the distribution of d among whom is given by an arbitrary finite Lebesgue measure. Preparing the ground for the main results of this paper, which follow below, in Section 4 we use a novel construction to show the following result (similar in spirit to other results regarding congestion games and crowding games). THEOREM 1.1 (INFORMAL VERSION OF THEOREMS 4.5, 4.10 AND 4.11, COROL-LARY 4.12, AND ALGORITHM 1).
(1) A Nash equilibrium among the shoppers exists. Furthermore, there exists such a Nash equilibrium for which the strategies can be computed in O(n 2 ) time, where n is the number of shops.
(2) The number of bottles of wine sold at each shop is the same across all Nash equilibria, and for each shopper, the exclusivity of the wine that she buys (i.e. the number of bottles sold throughout the day at the store selling this wine) is the same across all Nash equilibria. All these amounts can be computed together in O(n 2 ) time.
1.1.2. Wine sellers. Obviously, each wine seller would like to locate her store in a way that would maximize its sales volume. (By Theorem 1.1, this sales volume is well defined, assuming a Nash equilibrium among the shoppers.) That being said, as realestate prices rise the closer (in walking time) a shop is to Metropolis Central, each wine seller would like to place her store the farthest possible from the station, as long as this does not hurt sales. As we think of sales as indicative of daily income, and of real-estate cost as a one-time expense, we have that each wine seller would like to place her shop in a location that first and foremost maximizes sales, and only then (as a tie-breaking rule among locations that generate the same volume of sales) the farthest away (in walking time) from Metropolis Central. In Section 5.2, we show the following -the first of our main results regarding this two-stage competition. (1) The following is a super-strong 1 pure-strategy Nash equilibrium among n wine sellers: the shop that is closest to Metropolis Central is located in the farthest location from the station that is accessible by all shoppers, the second-closest shop is located at the first n-tile of walking distances (i.e. the farthest place accessible by all but 1 /n of shoppers), the third-closest shop is located at the second n-tile of walking distances (i.e. the farthest place accessible by all but 2 /n of shoppers), etc. (2) All shops have identical sales volumes in this Nash equilibrium. (3) No other (not necessarily super strong) Nash equilibria (up to permutations on the shops) exist, not even in mixed strategies.
We show the robustness of the Nash equilibrium defined in Theorem 1.2 even further by considering dynamics among wine sellers. A sequential best-response dynamic is a process starting with arbitrary shop locations, and in which at each turn an arbitrary wine seller relocates her shop to a location that, ceteris paribus, maximizes her preferences (we show that such a location, or rather such a distance, always exists for every possible measure on walking-time limits for shoppers); we assume that each wine seller is allowed to relocate her shop infinitely often. A round in a best-response dynamic is a sequence of consecutive steps in which each wine seller is allowed to relocate her shop at least once. Finally, a sequential δ-better-response dynamic is a sequential dynamic in which each relocation need not necessarily maximize the wine seller's preferences, as long as it increases her sales volume by at least δ of the entire market share (since we consider continuously-many shoppers, we demand a δ-improvement in order to avoid improvementsà la Zeno's "Race Course" paradox.) In Section 5.2, we show the following main result. THEOREM 1.3 (INFORMAL VERSION OF COROLLARIES 5.37 AND 5.38).
(1) For every δ > 0, every sequential δ-better-response dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium in finitely-many steps, and remains constant from that point onward. (2) Every best-response dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium in at most n rounds.
We also analyse dynamics in which more than one wine seller relocate their shops simultaneously. (See Corollary 5.35 and Theorems 5.15 and 5.22.) 1.1.3. Market Allocation. In the equilibrium defined in Theorem 1.2, the 1 /n of shoppers with smallest walking-time limits shop at the store closest to Metropolis Central, whose chosen proximity to Metropolis Central is the farthest that still accommodates this entire 1 /n; the next 1 /n of shoppers shop at the store second-closest to Metropolis Central, whose chosen proximity to Metropolis Central is the farthest that still accommodates this entire 1 /n; and so forth. Essentially, the market is allocated (i.e. split) among the various wine sellers based on the willingness of a shopper to venture far from Metropolis Central, and each wine seller chooses the farthest location accessible by the entirety of its allocated market share. Theorem 1.3 shows that this seemingly-cooperative market allocation among the various wine sellers arises as the unique possible outcome, not as a result of anticompetitive practices, but rather as a result of noncooperative dynamics, each wine seller only looking to myopically maximize her preferences at every step; no signalling (via e.g. location choice) or any other collusive or cooperative "trick" whatsoever is used in order to reach and maintain this market allocation. We further demonstrate this in Section 1.2.
Heterogeneous Wines.
Recall the above assumption that the qualities of the various wine types are indistinguishable. Consider that this is no longer the case, i.e. that some wines may be known to be of superior types, are more extravagantly packaged, or have some other attractive quality. In such a case, shoppers may be willing to compromise on "exclusivity" in favour of superior quality. More generally, instead of purchasing wine of minimum circulation, each shopper would like to minimize a wine-seller-dependent increasing function of this circulation, e.g. shoppers may wish to maximize the quotient of quality and circulation. We discuss such scenarios in Section 6. All of our results, and in particular Theorems 1.1 to 1.3, readily generalize to these scenarios as well, with only quantitative rather than qualitative changes; e.g. the unique market-share allocation in a merchant-equilibrium (which we precisely characterize) is no longer necessarily the allocation of 1 /n of the shoppers to each shop. In particular, we still obtain that the unique possible noncooperative outcome is for the market to be allocated (split) among the various wine sellers based on the shoppers' types, i.e. each shopper shopping at the store closest to Metropolis Central has a smaller walking-time limit than any of those shopping at the store second-closest to Metropolis Central, each of whom in turn having a smaller walking-time limit than all of those shopping at the third-closest store, etc., and each wine store chooses the farthest location accessible by the entirety of its allocated market share.
Alternative Interpretations
It is worthwhile to point out that our framework captures far more than merely the store-location scenario introduced above, by thinking of the walking time from Metropolis Central Station to a wine store as a quality of service (QoS) of sorts of this store -the closer a shop is to Central Station, the higher the quality of service that it provides. We now give a few brief examples of other possible applications stemming 4 Y. A. Gonczarowski and M. Tennenholtz from this insight; in each example, QoS is given a different meaning, which, in turn, results in a different meaning of market allocation (split) based on acceptable QoS. These examples provide insight into the breadth of meanings that can be captured by the idea of QoS, and into the meaning of market allocation (split) based on acceptable QoS. We henceforth use the more generic term producers to refer to e.g. wine sellers, and consumers to refer to e.g. shoppers. We start with a main applicative example.
Example 1.4 (Home Internet / Cellular Market; QoS=Low Latency). Consider a scenario in which the producers are internet service providers (ISPs), and the consumers are customers on the market for home internet. (Alternatively, one could think of producers as cellular operators, and of consumers as customers on the market for cellular service.) An ISP is typically characterized by two parameters: the de facto bandwidth (i.e. speed) of the connection that it provides, and the latency of its infrastructure. (Assume that the monthly price for a home internet connection is the same for all ISPs, and that this price is precisely what each customer can afford to pay for an internet connection.) Each customer is looking for one internet connection, and finds acceptable any connection with a latency of at most d milliseconds (a customer-dependent value -e.g. real-time gaming applications are known to be quite latency-sensitive); a customer would like to get the fastest connection possible, given that her latency constraint is met. If each ISP has the same total (i.e. overall) bandwidth, then the speed of the connection of a single customer subscribed to an ISP is inversely proportional to this ISP's number of subscribers, and so obtaining the fastest connection possible is equivalent to subscribing to a least-subscribed-to ISP. (Generalizing, we may imagine that some ISPs may have different total bandwidths than others, while some other ISPs may purchase additional total bandwidth as their subscriber pool grows; in such a scenario, in order to surf with greatest speed, each customer would prefer to subscribe not necessarily to a least-subscribed-to ISP, but rather to an ISP from whom the customer would receive the fastest connection, a calculation depending both on the total-bandwidth characteristics of the specific ISP and on its number of subscribers. As discussed above in the context of heterogeneous wines, we handle such scenarios as well.) Finally, each ISP would like to maximize its number of subscribers, but would like to erect the cheapest-possible (i.e. with highest latency) infrastructure, as long as this does not reduce its market share.
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In this scenario, the unique possible noncooperative outcome is the allocation of each 1 /n (this fraction varies here and henceforth if the total-bandwidth characteristics of ISPs are heterogeneous) of customers (based on acceptable latency levels) to a different ISP: the 1 /n of customers with strictest latency demands is allocated to one ISP (whose network is constructed to have the highest latency acceptable by this entire 1 /n), the second 1 /n is allocated to a second ISP (whose network is in turn constructed to have the highest latency acceptable by this entire 1 /n), and so forth.
Example 1.5 (Postgraduate Scholarships; QoS=Earlier Award Time). In Israel, there are three top-tier scholarships for science postgraduate students, all offering similar monetary support and all alike in prestige. These scholarships are mutually exclusive, in the sense that not only can no student be awarded more than one of them, but furthermore, it is not allowed to apply for more than one of them at any given year (anyone doing so is immediately disqualified from all three). Consider a rent-paying Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown 5 student (a consumer) faced with the decision of which scholarship (producer) to apply to; if this student has no prior regarding neither her quality nor that of other applicants, it is in her best interest to subscribe to the least-sought-after scholarship, as long as it is awarded no later than when this student's yearly rent payment is due. (Once again, one may consider scholarships of heterogeneous prestige or monetary prizes, in which case students have a tradeoff between scholarship quality and number of competitors.) Each scholarship fund would like to maximize the quality of its fellows, which, having no prior regarding student qualities either, essentially means maximizing its number of applicants; as long as this quality (equivalently, the number of applicants) is not compromised, a scholarship fund would like to award the scholarship as late as possible throughout the year, in order to earn more interest at the bank. (Assume that bank interests are progressive, and so negligible for any single student, but substantial for a fund.)
In this scenario, the unique possible noncooperative outcome is the allocation of each third (when all scholarships are as attractive) of students (based on rent payment dates) to a different scholarship: the third with earliest rent payment dates are allocated to one scholarship (whose award date is chosen to be the earliest of the rent payment dates of its applicants), the second third is allocated to a different scholarship (whose award date is in turn chosen to be the earliest of the rent payment dates of its applicants), and the third with latest rent payment dates are allocated to the remaining scholarship (whose award date is chosen to be the earliest of the rent payment dates of its applicants).
The Formation of Main Street
Now that we have presented the main results of this paper, let us briefly return to Downtown Metropolis. While we have characterized the distance of each wine shop from Metropolis Central, the direction from Metropolis Central to each such shop can be arbitrary. Not for long, though. Merchants from the nearby town of Smallville, the extra-extra-extra-virgin-olive-oil capital of the world, wishing to widen the visibility of their product, have started moving their stores to Downtown Metropolis as well. Now that Metropolis has become both the wine-and the extra-extra-extra-virgin-olive-oil capital of the world, each shopper arriving at Metropolis Central would like to purchase not only a bottle of wine, but also a bottle of olive oil. Nonetheless, the walkingtime limit of each shopper does not change -each shopper is still willing to walk at most 2d minutes in order to obtain both products. (This indeed introduces no change, as each shopper was previously willing to walk d minutes in each direction.) As with wine, each costumer prefers to minimize a seller-dependent function of the circulation of the type of olive oil that she purchases, as long as her walking-time constraint is met. (One may again consider e.g. the case in which one would like to maximize the quotient of quality to circulation, optimizing some form of tradeoff between quality and "boutiqueness".) Olive-oil merchants have preferences similar to those of wine sellers.
In Section 7, we show that under these conditions, generally the unique stablest outcome is for all shops to be placed on the same ray originating at Metropolis Central (with the distance of each store from Metropolis Central set as before, as if its good type were the only one on the market). This should be compared with the structure of many old European towns, at the heart of which lies the old stone-cobbled main street, on one end of which (as opposed to at the middle of which) lies the main town church.
RELATED WORK
Our consumer games are a form of congestion games. Congestion games with finitelymany players have been introduced by Rosenthal [1973] ; in fact, the term has been coined in a paper by Monderer and Shapley [1996] , titled "Potential Games", where it is shown that a game has a potential iff it is a congestion game. While the discussion there refers to atomic games with finitely-many players, work in computer science and game theory also deals with nonatomic games, in which there may be a continuum of players (see e.g. [Roughgarden and Tardos 2002] for work in CS that uses such a model). Holzman and Law-Yone [1997] and Holzman [2003] look at restrictions on strategy sets of congestion games; one way to view our consumer games is as a special form of restricted congestion games defined for general measure functions on agents' types, capturing their possible strategy sets. As it turns out, this set of games possess many desired game-theoretic properties. The actual games that we study are in fact two-stage games, where the second stage is a congestion game as discussed above; the first stage can be viewed as a form of facility-location game, where the main aim of producers is to select a location to be selected by as many consumers as possible. This resembles the literature on location theory initiated by Hotelling [1929] , although the utility function of the service providers in our setting is different, and allows for fine preferences based on distance from a location most preferred by consumers. Given the above, our model can be viewed as a novel combination of facility-location games among producers with congestion games among consumers.
Another type of related literature deals with scheduling and queuing with multiple machines, where the jobs choose among available services and the level of service they receive depends on the selections by other jobs. Recently, two-stage games in these contexts have been studied, consisting of a strategic selection by machines between queuing policies [Ashlagi et al. 2013] or scheduling policies [Ashlagi et al. 2010 ], followed by a strategic selection by jobs between the various selected policies. Our work introduces a novel type of a two-stage scenario, which may be considered as somewhat related. More remotely is the literature on competing mechanisms in the context of auctions, which employs such two phase setting, but in a very different context of mechanism design with money (see e.g. [McAfee 1993]) .
The proof of Theorem 1.1 draws its intuition from an analogy to a hydraulic system of communicating vessels (see Fig. 1 ). Kaminsky [2000] uses an analogy to quite a different system of communicating vessels to solve rationing problems; his motivation is quite different, and involves extending bilateral rationing rules. While Kaminsky uses a set of two-way communicating vessels, we use a set of one-way communicating vessels. In this context, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium among consumers may be regarded as a rationing problem with certain "reserves" for producers with high quality of service. Our treatment, especially in light of the discussion in Section 6 (see in particular Fig. 2 ), also sheds new light on rationing problems, as congestion games of sorts among a continuum of good-fragments.
NOTATION
Definition 3.1 (Notation).
-(Simplex). For a finite set S and a nonempty subset S ⊆ S, we define
(The set S will be clear from context.) -(Naturals). We denote the natural numbers by N {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
-(Nonnegative Reals). We denote the nonnegative reals by R ≥ {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}.
-(Maximizing Arguments). Given a set S and a function f : S → R that attains a maximum value on S, we denote the set of arguments in S maximizing f by arg Max s∈S f (s) {s ∈ S | f (s) = m}, where m Max s∈S f (s). -For every n ∈ N, we define P n {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}.
-Given a tuplet = (t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) ∈ S Pn for some set S and some n ∈ N, and given j ∈ P n and t ∈ S, we define (t −j , t ) (t 0 , . . . , t j−2 , t j−1 , t , t j+1 , t j+2 , . . . , t n−1 ) ∈ S Pn . -For every n ∈ N, we denote the set of permutations on P n by P n !.
PRELIMINARIES: THE CONSUMER GAME
Preparing the ground for the main results of this paper, in this section we define the congestion game among consumers, and use a novel construction 3 to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of equilibrium loads (results similar in spirit to other results regarding congestion games and crowding games [Schmeidler 1973; Milchtaich 2000] ), and to efficiently calculate these loads. Full proofs, as well as auxiliary results, are provided in Appendices A.1 and A.2.
Definition 4.1 (Quality-of-Service Space). For ease of presentation, we use T [0, 1] as the type space in the consumer game (and later as the strategy space in the producer game). We consider lower values as indicating higher qualities of service.
For the duration of this section, fix a finite Lebesgue measure µ on T , a natural n ∈ N and producer QoS levels (e.g. store distances)t = (t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) ∈ T
Pn
. We consider the n-producers consumer game (µ;t) = (µ; t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ), which we now define.
Definition 4.2 (Strategies). For every d ∈ T , we define the set of strategies available to a player with type (i.e. worst acceptable QoS) d as S d {j | t j ≤ d} ∪ {¬}, where ¬ denotes not consuming from any producer. We define S ∪ d∈T S d = P n ∪ {¬} -the set of pure strategies available to any player, and consider S as a measurable space with the σ-algebra 2 S of all of its subsets. (1) A pure-consumption (strategy) profile in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t) is a Lebesgue-measurable function s :
2) Given a pure-consumption profile s in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t), we define s j µ s −1 (j) for every j ∈ S -the load on producer j. ( s ¬ is the measure of consumers not consuming from any producer.) (3) A pure-consumption Nash equilibrium in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t) is a pure-consumption profile s s.t. for every d ∈ T , both the following hold.
We now turn to define mixed-consumption strategies. We think of such a strategy not as a probabilistic one, but rather as meaning "a certain fraction of the continuum of players with type d have one strategy, while others have other strategies". 5 3 Note added in proof: see Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz [2014] for a generalization of this construction to arbitrary resource-selection games. 4 As mentioned above, the results of this paper generalize also for a more general definition of the consumers' preferences, in which each consumer consumes from producers j with minimal f j s j (as opposed to minimal s j ), where (f j ) j∈Pn is a specification of an increasing continuous function for each producer. See Section 6 for more details. 5 Alternatively, e.g. in the ISPs scenario given in Example 1.4, if it is possible to pay a certain ISP α ∈ (0, 1) of the price of a monthly subscription and receive an internet connection that has α of the speed of a "regular" connection, then one may also think of a mixed-consumption strategy as buying several "partial" connections, using a cumulative budget that equals the price of one regular connection (thus, if all these partial connections are purchased from ISPs with the same load, then the combined speed of all these connections would be the regular speed of a connection purchased from any one of these ISPs.) 8 Y. A. Gonczarowski and M. Tennenholtz Definition 4.4 (Mixed-Consumption Profile/Nash Equilibrium).
(1) A mixed-consumption (strategy) profile in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t) is a Lebesgue-measurable function s :
(2) Given a mixed-consumption profile s in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t), we define s j T s j dµ for every j ∈ S -the load on producer j. ( s ¬ is the measure of consumers not consuming from any producer in this case as well.) (3) A mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t) is a mixed-consumption profile s s.t. for every d ∈ T , both of the following hold.
. If µ is atomless, then a pure-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t).
Example 4.6 (Necessity of Atomlessness Condition). Consider a nonzero measure µ concentrated entirely on the atom d = 1 ∈ T . For n > 1, no pure-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in any induced n-producers consumer game. Indeed, in any pureconsumption profile, all consumers with type d = 1 would consume from the same producer, leaving another producer with a strictly-lower load of 0; as this producer is acceptable by all consumers with type d = 1, they would all rather deviate to it.
Definition 4.7 (Effective Type). We say that two types d 1 , d 2 ∈ T are of the same effective type if S d1 = S d2 .
The Nash equilibrium constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.5 is asymmetric in the sense that players with the same effective type may behave differently. As we now show, this asymmetry cannot be avoided. Nonetheless, a reader who finds this asymmetry aesthetically-unpleasing may instead consider a more-symmetric, yet mixedconsumption, Nash equilibrium, which in fact exists even when µ is not atomless.
Definition 4.8 (Symmetric Strategy Profile). A strategy profile s is said to be sym-
e. each player's strategy depends only on the player's effective type.
Example 4.9 (Nonexistence of a Symmetric Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). Consider any nonzero measure µ. For n > 1, if t j = 0 for every j ∈ P n , then all consumers are of the same effective type. Thus, no symmetric pure-consumption equilibrium exists in the induced n-producers consumer game. Indeed, in any symmetric pure-consumption profile, since all consumers are of the same effective type, all would consume from the same producer, leaving another producer (acceptable to all) with a strictly-lower load of 0; therefore, all consumers would rather deviate to this producer. THEOREM 4.10 (∃ SYMMETRIC MIXED-CONSUMPTION NASH EQUILIBRIUM). A symmetric mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t). Furthermore, there exists such an equilibrium for which the strategies can be computed in O(n 2 ) time.
See Fig. 1 for an illustration of the constructive proof of Theorem 4.10; as illustrated, the intuition underlying this novel construction builds upon hydraulic systems of communicating vessels (nonetheless, the proofs given in Appendix A.1 are completely formal, of course). We now show that while in general many Nash equilibria may exist in the consumer game, they result in the same load for both consumers and producers. Some of the liquid penetrates into the fourth vessel, and later into the third and second vessels, so that no vessel has lower surface level than any vessel on its right. Fig. 1 . Illustration of the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.10 for n = 5. E.g. as exactly 80% of the blue (i.e. darkest when viewed in b/w) liquid in Fig. 1(f) is in the third vessel and the remaining 20% is in the second one, the strategy for all consumer types d ∈ [t 2 , t 3 ) in the symmetric mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium that we construct is 0.8 consumption from producer 2 and 0.2 consumption from producer 1. By Theorems 4.10 and 4.11, the following is well defined.
Definition 4.13 (Producer Load). For every j ∈ P n , we define j (t) to equal s j in any mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium s in (µ;t).
By the proof of Theorem 4.10, we obtain the following simple algorithm for directly calculating j (t) for all j, without the need to first calculate consumer's strategies. While this algorithm runs in O(n 2 ) time, i.e. has same worst-case asymptotic behaviour as explicitly computing a Nash equilibrium via Theorem 4.10 and then deducing all loads, it is considerably simpler, and also computes the loads sequentially, and so may be stopped mid-way, allowing to calculate the prefix ¬ (t), 0 (t), 1 (t), . . . , j (t) of the values of (t) in O(j · n) time.
ALGORITHM 1 Direct computation of j (t) for all j ∈ Pn 1: procedure COMPUTE-(µ; t0, . . . , tn−1) // Assumes t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1.
2:
tn ← 2 // Any value > 1 will do here; assumes µ is defined on [0, tn] but with support T .
3:
while k < n do 6:
for k ≤ j < k do return ( ¬, 0, . . . , n−1) 14: end procedure See Appendix A.2 for an analytic study of j , formalizing some main properties thereof, which we utilize in our proofs in the following sections. In particular, we show there that for every j, j (t) is nonincreasing in t j , weakly quasiconvex in t k for k = j, and Lipschitz (w.r.t. µ) in each coordinate with Lipschitz constant 1.
THE PRODUCER GAME
We now turn to the producer game, and to the main results of this paper. In this two-stage game, each producer chooses a strategy (i.e. QoS) in T , and the utilities are determined according to the loads on producers in Nash equilibria in the induced consumer game. For the duration of this section, fix a natural n ∈ N and a finite Lebesgue measure µ on T . Full proofs, as well as auxiliary results, are provided in Appendices A.3 and A.4.
In Section 5.1, we define a simpler version of the producer game that we define Section 5.2. While this simpler game has some trivialities that we point out, its analysis is nonetheless interesting, and the obtained results are useful when analysing the moreinvolved version in Section 5.2 (which is the one surveyed in the introduction). 
Coarse Preferences (A Simplified Producer Game)
Definition 5.1 (Producer Game with Coarse Preferences). We define the producer game with coarse preferences (n, µ, C ) as the n-player game, with set of players (called producers) P n , in which the pure-strategy space available to each producer is T , and in which for each pure-strategy profilet ∈ T Pn , the utility for each producer j ∈ P n is linear in j (t) (as defined in Definition 4.13).
5.1.1. Static Analysis. We begin with an analysis of domination in the producer game with coarse preferences, pointing out the trivialities in this simplified game, which will disappear in the more-involved version thereof that we analyse in Section 5.2.
Definition 5.2 (Safe Alternative; Dominant Strategy). Let t be a strategy in the game (n, µ, C ).
-We say that t is a safe alternative to some strategy t if for every strategy profile for all but one of the producers, playing t gives the remaining producer utility at least as high a utility as playing t . -We say that t is a dominant strategy if it is a safe alternative to all strategies.
Furthermore, each such dominant strategy guarantees a load of at least
n on each producer playing it. In particular, we have that every producer playing 0 ∈ T constitutes a Nash equilibrium. (We emphasize that this is by far not the only Nash equilibrium -see Theorem 5.5 below.) This and other trivialities that result from domination (as well as the domination itself) disappear in Section 5.2, when we refine the order of preferences of the various producers. Before that, though, we continue to explore the consumer game with coarse preferences, obtaining results that aid our analysis of the consumer game with refined preferences in Section 5.2 below. Our next step is to not only characterize the Nash equilibrium loads (an immediate corollary of Theorem 5.3), but furthermore, show that every strategy profile inducing these loads is a Nash equilibrium.
THEOREM 5.4 (NASH EQUILIBRIUM LOADS).
A pure-strategy profilet ∈ T Pn constitutes a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ) iff j (t) = µ(T ) n for every j ∈ P n . We proceed to directly characterize the strategies played in Nash equilibria, in a way that does not necessitate solving the induced consumer game.
It should be emphasized that Theorem 5.5 does not imply that Nash equilibria are interchangeable (i.e. that the set of Nash equilibria is a Cartesian product of sets of strategies for the various producers). Consider, for example, µ = U (T ) -the uniform measure on T . In this case, by Theorem 5.5, (0,
, and so is any permutation thereof. Nonetheless, every player playing n−1 n ∈ T does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. We now move on to examine the stability of the Nash equilibria in (n, µ, C ) against group deviations.
The study of stability against group deviations was initiated by Aumann [1959] , who considers deviations from which all deviators gain. Recently, the CS literature considers a considerably-stronger solution concept, according to which a deviation is considered beneficial even if only some of the participants in the deviating coalition gain, as long as none of the participants lose (see e.g. [Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz 2006] ). While stability against the classical all-gaining coalitional deviation is termed strong equilibrium, this more-demanding concept is referred to as super-strong equilibrium; there are very few results showing its existence in nontrivial settings. THEOREM 5.6 (ALL NASH EQUILIBRIA ARE SUPER STRONG). Lett ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). There exist no coalition P ⊆ P n and strategiest = (t j ) j∈P ∈ T P s.t. j (t −P ,t ) ≥ j (t) for every j ∈ P , with a strict inequality for at least one producer j ∈ P .
We conclude the static analysis of (n, µ, C ) by deducing generalizations of Theorems 5.3 to 5.6 for mixed-strategy profiles, as well as showing that no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exhibits any ex-post regret.
(1) (DOMINANT STRATEGIES). Let p be a mixed strategy.
6 p is a dominant strategy iff µ [0, Max supp(p)) = 0. Furthermore, each such dominant strategy guarantees a load of at least
n with probability 1 on each producer playing it.
n for every j ∈ P n with probability 1. (3) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION). A mixed-strategy profilep constitutes a Nash equilibrium iff there exists a permutation on the producers π ∈ P n ! s.t.
Letp be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. There exist no coalition P ⊆ P n and mixed strategiesp = (p j ) j∈P s.t.
for every j ∈ P , with a strict inequality for at least one producer j ∈ P .
THEOREM 5.8 (NO EX-POST REGRET IN MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA).
In any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ), with probability 1 there exists no ex-post regret for any producer. In other words, a realization of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is with probability 1 a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (1) A schedule is a sequence (P i ) ∞ i=0 of nonempty subsets of P n , s.t. j ∈ P i for infinitelymany values of i ∈ N, for every j ∈ P n . (2) A schedule
(We emphasize that this union need not be a disjoint union.) (5) Let i 1 ≤ i 2 ∈ N and let r ∈ N. We say that i 2 is reached from i 1 in r rounds if r − 1 is the largest number of pairwise-disjoint rounds into which {i 1 , i 1 + 1, . . . , i 2 − 2} can be partitioned. (Therefore, {i 1 , i 1 + 1, . . . , i 2 − 1} cannot be partitioned into r pairwise-disjoint rounds with a nonzero amount of "spare" trailing steps.)
Remark 5.10. In a simultaneous schedule, each step {i} constitutes a round.
Definition 5.11 (Weakly-/δ-Better-/Best-Response Dynamics; Lazy Dynamics).
(
is a sequence of strategy profiles s.t. both of the following hold for every i ∈ N.
-For every j ∈ P i , t i+1 j is a weakly-better response than t
. By slight abuse of notation, we sometimes write
, when the schedule is either inconsequential or clear from context. (2) A weakly-better-response dynamic is said to be a best-response dynamic if for every i ∈ N and j ∈ P i , t i+1 j is a best response tot
A weakly-better-response dynamic is said to be a δ-better-response dynamic if for every i ∈ N and j ∈ P i , t i+1 j is either a best response tot i −j , or a better response increasing j's load by at least δ compared to t
(4) A weakly-better-response dynamic is said to be lazy if for every i ∈ N and j ∈ P i , t
-Every best-response dynamic is a δ-better-response dynamic, for every δ > 0.
-Every δ-better-response dynamic is also a δ -better-response one, for every 0 < δ < δ.
-A weakly-better-response dynamic is a best-response dynamic iff it is a δ-betterresponse dynamic for δ = µ(T ).
Remark 5.13 (A Best Response Always Exists). Let j ∈ P n and lett −j ∈ T
Pn\{j}
. By Theorem 5.3, a best response (by j) tot −j exists in (n, µ, C ).
We commence with a negative result, showing that even best-response dynamics can go out of equilibrium.
Example 5.14 (Nonsequential Nonlazy Best-Response Dynamics may Go Out of Equilibrium). Let µ = U (T ). By Theorem 5.5, the (cyclically repeating) strategyprofile sequence (0, 0, . . . , 0), (
. . constitutes a (nonlazy) simultaneous best-response dynamic in (n, µ, C ) that visits nonequilibria infinitely often.
We continue by showing that the dynamic in Example 5.14 visiting Nash equilibria infinitely often is no coincidence.
is a Nash equilibrium for infinitely-many values of i. Moreover, the first Nash equilibrium is reached (from 0) in at most n· µ(T ) δn rounds, and from any later nonequilibrium, the next Nash equilibrium is reached in at most (n − 1) · µ(T ) δn rounds.
Remark 5.16. In Theorem 5.15,
is simultaneous, then "rounds" may be replaced with "steps". -Finer analysis of similar nature may be used to show both that n · µ(T ) δn may be replaced with n h=1
δn , n , and that (n − 1) · µ(T ) δn may be replaced with n h=2
δn , n − 1 . We conjecture that considerably tighter bounds (esp. for small δ) can be attained as well.
We now show that in a sense, Example 5.14 describes all the "issues" that might prevent best-and even δ-better-response dynamics from remaining in Nash equilibria.
Remark 5.17 (Lazy Better-Response Dynamics Remain in Nash Equilibrium). Once a lazy weakly-better-response dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium, it remains constant. (Directly by definition of Nash equilibrium and laziness.)
is sequential from some point, then once a (P i ) ∞ i=0 -scheduled weakly-better-response dynamic in (n, µ, C ) reaches a Nash equilibrium after that point, it never visits a nonequilibrium afterward.
COROLLARY 5.19 (SEQUENTIAL/LAZY δ-BETTER-RESPONSE DYNAMICS REACH NASH EQUILIBRIA AND REMAIN). For every δ > 0, every sequential or lazy δ-betterresponse dynamic in (n, µ, C ) reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps, and never visits a nonequilibrium after that point. As every best-response dynamic is a δ-better-response one for δ = µ(T ), we conclude from Theorem 5.15 that such a dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium in at most n · µ(T ) µ(T )n = n rounds and afterward always "re-reaches" a Nash equilibrium in at most (n − 1) · µ(T ) µ(T )n = n − 1 rounds. By applying some finer analysis, we can slightly improve this bound, and show that the new bound is tight.
THEOREM 5.22 (BEST-RESPONSE TIME-TO-EQUILIBRIUM AND TIME BETWEEN EQUILIBRIA). Every best-response dynamic in (n, µ, C ) reaches a Nash equilibrium in at most n − 1 rounds. Furthermore, if n > 2, then from any later nonequilibrium, the next Nash equilibrium is reached in at most n − 2 rounds.
Remark 5.23. In Theorem 5.22, as in Theorem 5.15, if the dynamic in question is simultaneous, then "rounds" may be replaced with "steps".
Example 5.24 (Tightness of Theorem 5.22). Let µ = U (T ). The following is a (nonlazy) simultaneous best-response dynamic in (n, µ, C ), in which i) no two consecutive strategy profiles are both Nash equilibria, ii) the first Nash equilibrium is reached in precisely n − 1 rounds (steps), and iii) from any nonequilibrium that follows a Nash equilibrium, the next Nash equilibrium is reached in precisely n − 2 rounds (steps): (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), ( (n, µ, C ) reaches a Nash equilibrium in at most a tight bound of n − 1 rounds, and never visits a nonequilibrium after that point.
Fine Preferences
Definition 5.26 (Producer Game with Fine Preferences). We define the producer game with fine preferences (n, µ, F ) as the n-player game, with set of players (called producers) P n , in which the pure-strategy space available to each producer is T , and in which for each pure-strategy profilet ∈ T Pn , the utility for each producer j ∈ P n is linear in j (t) (as defined in Definition 4.13), with tie breaking (i.e. infinitesimal improvement) in favour of larger values of t j over smaller ones.
5.2.1. Static Analysis. We define safe alternatives and dominant strategies in (n, µ, F ) as in Definition 5.2, only w.r.t. fine preferences. The following proposition shows that the tie-breaking refinement of the producers' preferences into "fine preferences" indeed successfully removes the triviality captured by Theorem 5.3, in a strong sense. We now formally conclude the results captured informally in Theorem 1.2: THEOREM 5.28 (∃! NASH EQUILIBRIUM, AND IT IS SUPER STRONG 10 ). A unique (up to permutations) pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in (n, µ, F ). The sorted Nash-equilibrium strategies
The load on each producer in this equilibrium is
n . Furthermore, this equilibrium is super strong.
COROLLARY 5.29 (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION -SPECIAL CASE).
If the CDF of µ is continuous (i.e. µ is atomless) and strictly increasing, then for every j ∈ P n , the j th sorted Nash-equilibrium strategy, t j , is the unique strategy satisfying
. Every mixedstrategy Nash equilibria in (n, µ, F ) is in fact in pure strategies (and is thus given by Theorem 5.28/Corollary 5.29). If µ is atomless, then in the Nash equilibrium defined in Theorem 5.28 and Corollary 5.29, almost all (i.e. except for maybe an amount of measure zero) of the 1 /n of consumers (as measured by µ) with numerically-smallest types consume from producer 0, whose chosen strategy is the numerically-largest one that accommodates almost all of this 1 /n; almost all of the next 1 /n of consumers consume from producer 1, whose chosen strategy is the numerically-largest one that accommodates almost all of this 1 /n, and so forth. Essentially, the market is allocated (i.e. split) among the various producers based on consumer types, and each producer chooses the numerically-largest strategy that accommodates almost all of its allocated market share. We conclude the static analysis of (n, µ, F ) by formalizing these results. THEOREM 5.31 (MARKET ALLOCATION). Let t 0 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 ∈ T s.t.t constitutes a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ), and let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the induced consumer game (µ;t). If µ is atomless, then for every
Remark 5.32 (Producer Strategies are Chosen according to the Market Allocation). By Theorem 5.28, if µ is atomless, then the j th sorted Nash-equilibrium strategy, t j , is the numerically-largest strategy (i.e. lowest QoS) acceptable by almost all consumer
We define weakly-/δ-better/best-response dynamics in (n, µ, F ) as in Definition 5.11, only with best responses defined w.r.t. fine preferences. In particular, the definition of improvement by at least δ remains unchanged (i.e. it is defined solely w.r.t. the load). The last part of Remark 5.12 thus becomes:
Remark 5.33. In (n, µ, F ), a weakly-better-response dynamic is a best-response dynamic iff it is a δ-better-response dynamic for some (equivalently, for all) δ > µ(T ).
We start by noting that best responses always exist -an observation that for general µ is considerably less trivial w.r.t. fine preferences than w.r.t. coarse ones. PROPOSITION 5.34 (A UNIQUE BEST RESPONSE ALWAYS EXISTS). Let j ∈ P n and lett −j ∈ T
Pn\{j}
. A unique best response (by j) tot −j exists in (n, µ, F ).
We give two proofs for Proposition 5.34: the first -quite-concise, and the second, while requiring more involved arguments, is constructive in the sense that in contrast to the first, it presents the best response in the form Max{t ∈ T | µ [0, t) ≤ m}, for m that can be explicitly calculated.
As in (n, µ, F ) no producer is ever indifferent between two strategies, all weaklybetter-response dynamics in this game are lazy; therefore, if such a dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium, it remains constant from that point on. We also note that Example 5.14 is also an example of a lazy best-response dynamic in (n, µ, F ) that never reaches a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, as best responses in (n, µ, F ) are unique, and as the strategies in each Nash equilibrium are distinct if µ is atomless, we have that no simultaneous best-response dynamic starting from a strategy profile with two or more identical strategies ever reaches a Nash equilibrium. It should be noted that this is not a boundary phenomenon; for example, if µ [0, t 0 j ) > 0 for all j ∈ P n , then the best responses of all producers are identical (see Corollary A.29 in Appendix A.4). Many more such examples may be constructed. We now show that these phenomena are all avoided by sequential dynamics. COROLLARY 5.35. Theorems 5.15 and 5.22 hold also regarding reaching a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ, C ) by dynamics in the game (n, µ, F ).
is sequential from some point, then for every δ > 0, at most one round after a δ-better-response dynamic in (n, µ, F ) reaches a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ, C ) after that point, it reaches a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ, F ), and remains constant from that point onward.
We hence formally conclude the results captured informally in Theorem 1.3: COROLLARY 5.37 (SEQUENTIAL δ-BETTER-RESPONSE DYNAMICS CONVERGE). For every δ > 0, every sequential δ-better-response dynamic in (n, µ, F ) reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps, and remains constant from that point onward. 
COROLLARY 5.38 (SEQUENTIAL BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS CONVERGE FAST).
Every sequential or lazy best-response dynamic in (n, µ, F ) reaches a Nash equilibrium in at most n rounds, and never visits a nonequilibrium after that point.
We conjecture than an even-tighter bound on convergence time than in Corollaries 5.35 and 5.38 is attainable.
Corollaries 5.37 and 5.38 show that the seemingly-cooperative market allocation (split) among the various producers shown above to be exhibited in every Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ) arises as the unique possible outcome, not as a result of anticompetitive practices, but rather as a result of noncooperative dynamics, each producer only looking to myopically maximize its preferences at every step; as the best response to any strategy profile is unique, no signalling or any other collusive or cooperative "trick" whatsoever is used in order to reach and maintain this market allocation.
HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCTS
We have so far assumed that each consumer wishes to consume from producers with least loads. Recall Example 1.4 from the introduction, regarding ISPs and customers; in this example, we may imagine that some ISPs may have different total bandwidth than others, while some other ISPs may purchase more total bandwidth as their subscriber pool grows. In such a scenario, in order to surf with greatest speed, each consumer would no longer like to consume from a producer with least j (i.e. with as few subscribers as possible), but would rather consume from a producer with least f j ( j ), where f j is an increasing continuous function for every j ∈ P n , possibly differing between producers. The results in this paper lend to generalization also to such a scenario via similar methods, with only quantitative rather than qualitative changes; notably, the unique market-share allocation in both fine-and coarse-preferences Nash equilibria among producers is generally no longer the allocation of 1 /n of the market to each of the producers. E.g. Theorems 5.3 to 5.5 thus become: THEOREM 6.1 (HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCTS -COARSE PREFERENCES). There exist amounts˜ 0 ,˜ 1 . . . ,˜ n−1 ∈ 0, µ(T ) (for homogeneous products,˜ j = µ(T ) n for every j ∈ P n ), s.t. all of the following hold.
(1) (DOMINANT STRATEGIES). Each dominant strategy in (n, µ, C ) (the characterization of such strategies is unchanged from that given in the first part of Theorem 5.3), when played by a producer j ∈ P n , guarantees a load of at least˜ j on this producer. (2) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM LOADS). A pure-strategy profilet ∈ T Pn constitutes a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ) iff j (t) =˜ j for every j ∈ P n . (3) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION). Lett be a pure-strategy profile and let π ∈ P n ! be a permutation s.t.
k=0˜ π(k) for every j ∈ P n . Consequently, Theorem 5.28 and Corollary 5.29 become: THEOREM 6.2 (HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCTS -FINE PREFERENCES).
(1) (∃! NASH EQUILIBRIUM, AND IT IS SUPER STRONG). Let π ∈ P n ! be a permutation s.t. there do not exist j < k ∈ P n s.t.˜ π(j) = 0 while˜ π(k) = 0. A unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium s.t. t π(0) ≤ · · · ≤ t π(n−1) exists in (n, µ, F ). The strategies of this equilibrium are given by t π(j) Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) ≤ j−1 k=0˜ π(k) for every j ∈ P n . The load on each producer j ∈ P n in this Nash equilibrium is˜ j . Furthermore, this equilibrium is super strong. No other Nash equilibria exist in (n, µ, F ). 2 . A system of 5 one-way communicating vessels, corresponding to 5 heterogeneous ISPs (see Example 1.4) with the following characteristics, from left to right (i.e. from lowest latency/highest QoS to highest latency/lowest QoS): A "normal" ISP, an ISP with half the total bandwidth of a "normal" one, an ISP whose total bandwidth somewhat increases with its number of subscribers, an ISP whose total bandwidth somewhat decreases with its number of subscribers, and a "normal" ISP who buys additional bandwidth if needed, so that the bandwidth for a single subscriber never drops below some threshold. (After the surface of the liquid in the fifth vessel reaches the tube connecting this vessel to the container on its right, which we also consider as part of the fifth vessel, any additional liquid poured into this vessel accumulates in the container on the right; assume that this container is large enough so as to never fill up.) We emphasize that the technical modifications to Lemma A.2 to accommodate any collection of increasing continuous functions (f j ) j∈Pn are straightforward and do not require defining any shapes for any vessels -this is done purely to convey intuition. (We require that the functions be strictly increasing for simplicity, however these results still hold if one of them is merely nondecreasing, e.g. as in the scenario depicted in the figure; however, if more than one of these functions is not strictly increasing, e.g. if a sixth vessel identical to the fifth one is added in this figure, then Theorem 4.11 may no longer hold.) The producer-equilibrium loads˜ 0 , . . . ,˜ n−1 can be found by pouring the entire µ(T ) of liquid into the rightmost vessel (i.e. computing the loads when each producer j's strategy is the˜ j -guaranteeing strategy 0 ∈ T ), or, equivalently, by simply removing the one-way valves (i.e. permitting liquid flow in both directions) and pouring µ(T ) liquid into the system (observe that either way, if all vessels are of the same shape, then we indeed obtain˜ j = µ(T ) n for every j ∈ Pn, as in the previous sections); a similar "two-way" calculation among subsets of vessels generalizes Algorithm 1 to this scenario.
(2) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION -SPECIAL CASE). If the CDF of µ is continuous (i.e. µ is atomless) and strictly increasing, then for every j ∈ P n , in the Nash equilibrium corresponding to a permutation π ∈ P n ! with the above properties, t π(j) is the unique strategy satisfying µ [0, t π(j) ) = j−1 k=0˜ π(k) . The remainder of the results of this paper, including those regarding dynamics, readily generalize to this scenario as well. So, we once again have that in a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ), the market is allocated (split) among producers based on consumer types; if µ is atomless and t π(0) ≤ · · · ≤ t π(n−1) , then almost all of the˜ π(0) consumers with numerically-smallest types consume from producer π(0) (who chooses the largest strategy acceptable by almost all of them), almost all of the next˜ π(1) consumers consume from producer π(1) (who chooses the largest strategy acceptable by almost all of them), and so forth. See Fig. 2 for an illustration regarding the adaptation of the results from Section 4 to this generalized model, and the calculation of˜ 0 , . . . ,˜ n−1 .
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THE FORMATION OF MAIN STREET
We conclude the body of this paper with an aesthetically-appealing corollary. Let us consider a two-goods facility-location problem such as that in the introduction. (The results of this section readily generalize also to the case of more than two good types.) Formally, we have n 1 ∈ N producers of the first good (e.g. wine) and n 2 ∈ N producers of the second good (e.g. olive oil). The strategy of each producer is a point on the plane; a pure-consumption strategy of a consumer with type d ∈ T is a pair (j, k) ∈ P n1 × P n2 , denoting consumption of the first good from producer j of this good, and of the second good -from producer k of that good; each consumer would like to minimize f
(e.g. the sum of the quotients of the quality and circulation for each good), subject to the constraint the that circumference of the triangle whose vertices are the origin and the locations (strategies) of producer j of good 1 and of producer k of good 2 does not exceed 2d (the density of consumer types, as given by µ, remains unchanged). Each producer would like to first and foremost maximize its number of consumers, and only as a tie-breaker, maximize the norm of its strategy (i.e. its distance from the origin). Under these conditions, roughly speaking, each producer would like to be located so that visiting it would never be too much of a detour on the way from the origin to a producer of the other good. Formally, we obtain: (See Appendix A.5 for a proof, as well as a discussion regarding the necessity of the conditions below.) THEOREM 7.1 (THE UNIQUE SUPER-STRONG EQUILIBRIUM IS A MAIN STREET ORIGINATING FROM THE ORIGIN). Let˜ 1 0 , . . . ,˜ 1 n1−1 be the producer-equilibrium loads when only the first good is on the market (i.e. as defined in Section 6 when the only producers are the n 1 producers of good 1) and let˜ 2 0 , . . . ,˜ 2 n2−1 be the producer-equilibrium loads when only the second good is on the market. If no nonempty proper subset of the former loads and no nonempty proper subset of the latter loads have the same sum, and if˜ g j > 0 for all g, j, then a producer strategy profile is a super-strong equilibrium iff the strategies of all producers of both products are on the same ray from the origin, with distances from the origin as in Theorem 6.2 (when computed separately for each good).
While most readers are likely to consider the formation of a main street as a fairlynatural phenomenon due to its abundance in many cities, some readers may find it somewhat less natural for this main street, as deduced in Theorem 7.1, to originate from the city centre (named Metropolis Central in the introduction), rather than having the city centre in its middle. Such readers may compare this with the structure of many old European towns, at the heart of which lies the old stone-cobbled main street, on one end of which (as opposed to at the middle of which) lies the main town church. 
APPENDIX A. PROOFS AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS
A.1. Proofs and Additional Results for Section 4
We commence with a few lemmas used in the proofs of Theorems 4.5 and 4.10.
LEMMA A.1 (LOAD IS NONINCREASING IN STRATEGY). Under the definitions of Section 4, if t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 , then for every mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium s in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t), we have (1)
Pn s.t. the following hold for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
(1) p i j = 0 for every j < i. -If
In the setting of Fig. 1, p n describes the rise of liquid before we begin pouring the additional amount m, while for every i ∈ P n , p i describes the rise of liquid at the last instant during the pouring process, in which no water has risen except in vessels i, i + 1, . . . , n − 1. (This can be either the final rise in liquid if i = 0 or if the final rise does not involve a change in the amount of liquid in vessels j < i, or alternatively the rise in liquid just before the liquid in vessel i − 1 begins to rise.)
For the base case, we define p n ≡ 0, and all parts trivially hold (with h n n−1 ). For the construction step, let i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} and assume that p 
Finally, for every j < i, by nonincreasing and by definition of r we have j ≥ i−1 ≥ h i+1 + r n−i = h i , and the proof of the construction is complete. Letĩ ∈ {0, . . . , n} be largest s.t.
n−1 j=0 pĩ j = m;ĩ is well defined by Property 2 for i = 0. We now show that p pĩ meets the conditions of the lemma. By definition, n−1 j=0 p j = m. Let j ∈ P n \ {n − 1}. If j <ĩ − 1, then by Property 1 for i =ĩ, we have j + p j = j ≥ j+1 = j+1 + p j+1 . If j =ĩ − 1, then by Properties 1 and 3 for i =ĩ and by definition of ı, we have j + p j = j = ĩ−1 ≥ hĩ = ĩ + pĩ = j+1 + p j+1 . Otherwise, i.e. if j >ĩ − 1, then by Property 3 for i =ĩ and by definition ofĩ, we have j + p j = hĩ = j+1 + p j+1 .
We conclude that min j∈Pn { j + p j } = n−1 + p n−1 . For every k ∈ P n s.t. p k > 0, by Property 1 for i =ĩ we have k ≥ĩ. Therefore, by Property 3 for i =ĩ and by definition ofĩ, we have k + p k = hĩ = n−1 + p n−1 = min j∈Pn { j + p j }, as required.
Finally, although it may seem in first glance that O(n 2 ) time may be required to compute p, we note that the sequence (h i ) n i=0 can be computed in O(n) time, that from this sequenceĩ can be deduced in O(n) time as the largest s.t. hĩ = h 0 , and that from both, p can be calculated in O(n) time: p j = 0 for j <ĩ by Property 1 for i =ĩ, while p j = hĩ − j for j ≥ĩ by Property 3 for i =ĩ.
We now prove Theorem 4.10, and then deduce Theorem 4.5 therefrom. Alternatively, Theorem 4.5 can also be proven directly from Lemma A.2, similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.10.
Definition A.3. For a finite Lebesgue measure µ on T and a Lebesgue-measurable set E ⊆ T , we denote by µ| ∩E the finite Lebesgue measure on T given by µ| ∩E (A) µ(A ∩ E).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.10. We prove the claim by induction on n. (Recall that the construction underlying this proof is illustrated by Fig. 1 ; also recall the explanation preceding the statement of Lemma A.2 regarding the meaning of that lemma in the context of that figure. ) Base (n = 0): In this case, S = {¬}, and so s ≡ 1 {¬} is a Nash equilibrium as required.
Step (n > 0): Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 . By the induction hypothesis, there exists a symmetric mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium s in the (n − 1)-producers consumer game (µ| ∩[0,tn−1) ; t 0 , . . . , t n−2 ). If µ [t n−1 , 1] = 0, then we define a mixed-consumption profile s in (µ;t) s.t. s| [0,tn−1) = s [0,tn−1) , and s| [tn−1,1] ≡ 1 {n−1} . As s is symmetric in (µ| ∩[0,tn−1) ; t 0 , . . . , t n−2 ), so is s in (µ;t). As s j = s j for every j ∈ P n−1 , by s being a Nash equilibrium in (µ| ∩[0,tn−1) ; t 0 , . . . , t n−2 ) we have that no player of any type d ∈ [0, t n−1 ) has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from s. As µ [t n−1 , 1] = 0, we have s n−1 = 0, and so players of types d ∈ [t n−1 , 1] have no incentive to deviate from s either. Therefore, s is a symmetric Nash equilibrium as required, and the proof for this case is complete. Assume therefore, henceforth, that µ [t n−1 , 1] > 0.
Recall that The complexity claim follows as each inductive step requires O(n) time -the time required to calculate p, by Lemma A.2. COROLLARY A.4. Let h ∈ P n , let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the h-producers consumer game (µ| ∩[0,t h ) ; t 0 , . . . , t h−1 ), and let s be the mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t) constructed iteratively from s as in the proof of Theorem 4.10. For every 0 ≤ j < h, we have LEMMA A.5 (THEOREM 4.10 ⇒ THEOREM 4.5). If a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in the n-producers consumer game (µ;t), and if µ is atomless, then a pure-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in this game as well.
PROOF. Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 . Let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the game (µ;t). For every i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2}, set C 
, and define C i k C i , and C i j ∅ for every j ∈ S \ {k}. Note that in this case we also have that
We define a measurable function s : T → S by s | ∪ i∈S C i j ≡ j for every j ∈ S. For every j ∈ S, we note that
We conclude by showing that s is indeed a pure-strategy profile, and moreovera Nash equilibrium. Let d ∈ T ; by definition there exists i ∈ S s.t. We thus obtain both that k < n−1, and that PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.12. Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 . Let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the game (µ;t), let d ∈ T and let k ∈ supp s(d) . If d < t j for all j ∈ P n , then k = ¬ and so s k = µ [0, t 0 )). Otherwise, k = ¬ and so d ≥ t 0 ; let i ∈ P n be largest s.t. From Algorithm 1, we obtain the following recursive identity for k (t).
COROLLARY A.6. If t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 , then defining t n 2, we have
(where by slight abuse of notation, µ is treated as a measure on [0, 2] with support T ) for every k ∈ P n .
PROOF. A direct corollary of Algorithm 1, by considering two cases: in the first, either k = 0 or k (t) < k−1 (t) (and so the given value k is the value of the variable k in some iteration of Algorithm 1); in the second, k > 0 and k (t) = k−1 (t) (and so Algorithm 1 calculates both k (t) and k−1 (t) in the same iteration of the while loop, and therefore they are identical; it is straightforward to verify that the expression in the statement evaluates to the same value for both k − 1 and k in this case).
A.2. Analysis of
Before moving on to prove the results presented in Section 5, we now formalize three analytic properties of the function (defined in Definition 4.13), which we later utilize when proving the results of Section 5. The first property is that the load on a producer does not decrease if the producer raises the offered quality of service (i.e. lowers its strategy).
LEMMA A.7 ( j IS NONINCREASING IN t j ). For every j ∈ P n and for everyt ∈ T Pn and t j ∈ T , if t j < t j , then j (t −j , t j ) ≤ j (t).
PROOF. Lett ∈ T
Pn
, k ∈ P n and t k ∈ (t k , 1]. Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 ∈ T . If k = n − 1, then it is enough to consider the case t k < t k ≤ t k+1 . Let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the induced consumer game (µ;t). For every j ∈ P n \ {k}, define t j t j . Let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ;t ), and assume for contradiction that s k > s k . Let i ∈ P n be maximal s.t. , we obtain also that s j ≥˜ j for every 0 ≤ j < h. As k ≥ h, we have that t j = t j for every 0 ≤ j < h and that t h−1 ≥ t h−1 ; therefore,˜ j ≥˜ j for every 0 ≤ j < h. (This follows by by tracing the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.10, as all inductive steps but the last are identical, while the last, examining Lemma A.2, increases each load by no less when computing˜ than when computing˜ ; in the context of Fig. 1 , pouring a additional nonnegative amount of liquid into the rightmost vessel does not cause the liquid level in any vessel to fall. Alternatively, this can also be seen by tracing Algorithm 1, as each iteration when computing˜ either computes the same load values for the producers as the corresponding iteration when computing˜ , or is the last, thus computing loads that are not lower than those computed for˜ .) Combining all of these, we have , so s is not a Nash equilibrium in (µ;t ) -a contradiction as well.
We note that an alternative proof may also be given via Algorithm 1 and Corollary A.6.
The second property is that the load on producer j cannot increase as a result of other producers moving closer to j's quality of service. LEMMA A.8 ( j IS WEAKLY QUASICONVEX IN t k ). For every j ∈ P n ∪ {¬} and j = k ∈ P n and for everyt ∈ T Pn and t k ∈ T , if j = ¬ and either
PROOF. Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 . If k = n − 1, then it is enough to consider the case t k < t k ≤ t k+1 . Let s and s be mixed-consumption Nash equilibria in (µ;t) and (µ;t −k , t k ), respectively. Assume for contradiction that for every i ≤ j < h, with a strict inequality for j = i by definition of i, and so 
Finally, the last property is that small perturbations in the producers' strategies result in quantifiably-small changes in the loads on the various producers.
LEMMA A.9 ( IS LIPSCHITZ IN EACH COORDINATE WITH LIPSCHITZ CONSTANT 1). For every j, k ∈ P n and for everyt ∈ T
PROOF. Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 . If k = n − 1, then it is enough to consider the case t k < t k ≤ t k+1 . Let s and s be mixed-consumption Nash equilibria in (µ;t) and (µ;t −k , t k ), respectively. Define S k P k ∪ {¬}. We start by showing that
. If k = 0, then this claim holds, as in this case S k = {¬}, and by definition of s and s we have We note that an alternative proof may also be given via Algorithm 1 / Corollary A.6. 
n . Alternatively, by Lemma A.8, j (t) is minimal given t j when t i = t j for every i ∈ P n \ {j}. By Theorem 4.11, by anonymity, and by definition of Nash equilibrium, the load on each producer in this case is exactly
n . PROOF. A direct corollary of Lemma A.10.
Definition A.12 (Domination). Let t, t be strategies in (n, µ, C ).
-We say that t weakly dominates t if t is a safe alternative to t and moreover, there exists some strategy profile for all but one of the producers, s.t. playing t gives the remaining producer strictly higher utility than playing t . -We say that t strongly dominates t if for every strategy profile for all but one of the producers, playing t gives the remaining producer strictly higher utility than playing t .
LEMMA A.13 (DOMINATION). Let t < t ∈ T be strategies in (n, µ, C ).
(1) t is a safe alternative to t .
PROOF. Part 1 follows from Lemma A.7. We move on to proving Part 2. ⇒: Assume that µ [t, t ) = 0; by Algorithm 1 / Corollary A.6, t and t are equivalent, and a fortiori t is a safe alternative to t. Nonetheless, we now also directly show that t and t are equivalent. Lett −0 ∈ T Pn\{0} , and let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ;t −0 , t). Let s be the mixed-consumption profile in (µ;t −0 , t ) s.t. s | T \[t,t ) = s| T \[t,t ) and s.t. for every d ∈ [t, t ), if S d = {¬} w.r.t. (µ;t −0 , t ) then s (d) = 1 {¬} , and otherwise s (d) = 1 {j} for some j ∈ arg Max j∈S d t j . As s = s almost everywhere w.r.t. µ, we have that s j = s j for all j ∈ P n . By definition of s, therefore no type d ∈ T \ [t, t ) has any incentive to deviate from s in the latter game. By Lemma A.1 (for s) and by definition of s , neither does any type d ∈ [t, t ) have any incentive to deviate from s in the latter game. Therefore, s is a Nash equilibrium in (µ;t −0 , t ). As in particular s 0 = s 0 , the proof of this direction is complete. ⇐: Assume that µ [t, t ) > 0; we will show that t is not a safe alternative to t. Define a µ [t, t ) > 0, b µ [t , 1) and c µ {1} . By Algorithm 1, we have 1, 1, . . . , 1) , and the proof of this direction is complete as well.
We conclude by proving Part 3. ⇒:
. Therefore,
, and hence
. By Theorem 4.11, by anonymity, and by definition of Nash equilibrium, the load on every producer, and in particular on producer 0, in a Nash equilibrium in the n-producer game (µ; t, t, . . . , t) is
, by Algorithm 1 the load on every producer, and in particular on producer 0, in a Nash equilibrium in the game (µ| ∩[0,t ) ; t , t, t, . . . , t) is
as well, as required.
. By Lemma A.10 and by definition of legal strategies in the consumer game, we obtain 0 (
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3. The first statement is a direct corollary of Lemma A.13, and the second -of Corollary A.11. LEMMA A.14. Lett ∈ T Pn and let s be a mixed-consumption profile in the consumer game (µ;t). If
for every j ∈ P n , and if s ¬ (d) = 0 whenever S d = {¬}, then s constitutes a Nash equilibrium in this game.
PROOF. Directly from definition of mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium, no consumer has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from s.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.4. The first part (⇒) follows directly from Corollary A.11. For the second part (⇐), lett be a pure-strategy profile in (n, µ, C ) s.t. j (t) = µ(T ) n for every j ∈ P n . Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 , and let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the induced consumer game (µ;t); therefore,
n for every j ∈ P n . Let k ∈ P n and let t k ∈ T ; we will show that producer k has no incentive to deviate to t k from t k . If t k < t k , then this follows directly from Lemma A.13(1). We therefore consider the case in which
(This indeed is a mixed-consumption profile since t k < t k and by definition of N .) As µ(N ) = 0, we have
n for every j ∈ P n . Thus, by Lemma A.14 and by definition of s via N , we conclude that s is a Nash equilibrium in (µ;t −k , t k ), and so k has no incentive to deviate to t k from t k in this case either. COROLLARY A.15 (LEAST/MOST NASH EQUILIBRIUM LOAD). Let t 0 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 ∈ T . The pure-strategy profilet constitutes a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ) iff either of the following equivalent conditions hold.
n . PROOF. A direct corollary of Theorem 5.4 and Lemma A.1. PROOF OF THEOREM 5.5. ⇒: Assume thatt constitutes a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). Let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the induced consumer game (µ;t). For every j ∈ P n , by Theorem 5.4, we obtain
n ·µ(T ) for every j ∈ P n ; in particular, µ [0, t 0 ) = 0. Let s be a mixed-consumption profile in the induced consumer game (µ;t). By Theorem 5.4, it is enough to show that
n for every j ∈ P n . Assume for contradiction that this is not the case. Therefore, as
n ; let k be maximal with this property. By Lemma A.1, we have
, so s is not a Nash equilibrium -a contradiction.
We note that an alternative proof of the second direction (⇐) may also be given via Algorithm 1 / Corollary A.6.
The second direction (⇐) of Theorem 5.5 can also be proven constructively. Such a proof is quite tedious in the general case, but simplifies greatly when µ is atomless. E.g. if µ = U (T ) the uniform measure, then whenever t 0 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 meet the conditions of Theorem 5.5, then a Nash equilibrium can be formed by allocating the market as follows: every d ∈ [0, 1 n ) plays the pure strategy 0 ∈ P n (the conditions of Theorem 5.5 guarantee that this is a legal strategy for all such d), every d ∈ [ 1 n , 2 n ) plays the pure strategy 1 ∈ P n (once again, the conditions of Theorem 5.5 guarantee that this is a legal strategy for all such d), and so on, until every d ∈ [ n−1 n , 1], playing the pure strategy n − 1 ∈ P n . (We remark that if t j = j n for every j ∈ P n , then this is in fact the unique Nash equilibrium among consumers, up to modifications of measure zero. More about this allocation and Nash equilibrium -in Theorem 5.31 and Remark 5.32 in Appendix A.4.) The load on each producer in this case is precisely 1 n , and by Lemma A.14 and Theorem 5.4, the proof is complete.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.6. Assume w.l.o.g. that t 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 and assume for contradiction that P ⊆ P n andt ∈ T P as in the statement exist. Let s be a mixedconsumption Nash equilibrium in (µ;t −P ,t ). As there exists j ∈ P s.t.
(with the last equality by Theorem 5.4), and as n−1 j=0 s j ≤ µ(T ), there thus exists a producer k ∈ P n s.t.
n -let ∅ = K ⊆ P n be the set of all such producers; by definition of P and by Theorem 5.4, we have K ⊆ P n \P . By Lemma A.1, K = {n−1, n− 2, . . . , n − |K|}. Therefore, and by Theorem 5.5,
n > s n−|K| , and so (as n − |K| / ∈ P ) we have that s is not a Nash equilibrium in (µ;t −P ,t ) -a contradiction.
PROOF OF THEOREMS 5.7 AND 5.8. Theorem 5.7(1) follows directly from Theorem 5.3. We move on to proving Theorem 5.8 and Theorem 5.7(2). Letp be a mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). By Corollary A.11, E j (p) ≥ every j ∈ P n ; since n−1 j=0 j (p) ≤ µ(T ), and by linearity of expectation, we obtain E j (p) = µ(T ) n for every j ∈ P n . Let j ∈ P n . By Lemma A.13(1), we have
As j has no incentive to deviate from p j to playing 0 ∈ T , we thus have that j (p −j , 1 {0} ) = j (p) with probability 1. By Corollary A.11, we have that
n , and so j (p) ≥ µ(T ) n with probability 1.
n with probability 1. Let nowp be a mixed-strategy profile in (n, µ, C ), s.t. j (p) = µ(T ) n with probability 1 for every j ∈ P n . By Theorem 5.4, the resulting realization is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1, and so with probability 1 no ex-post regret exists and a fortiorip is a Nash equilibrium.
We move on to proving Theorem 5.7(3). Letp be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). We iteratively build a permutation π ∈ P n ! s.t. µ [0, Max supp(p π(j) )) ≤ j n for every j ∈ P n . Let k ∈ P n and assume that π(j) has been defined for all 0 ≤ j < k. Define U P n \ {π (0), . . . , π(k − 1)} and let t min be a random variable denoting the numerically-smallest strategy realization of U , i.e. t min min j∈U p j . By Theorem 5.7(2), with probability 1 we have j∈U j (p) = n−k n · µ(T ); therefore, with probability 1 we have
Let nowp be a mixed-strategy profile in (n, µ, C ),
for every j ∈ P n with probability 1. By Theorem 5.5, the resulting realization is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1, and so with probability 1 no ex-post regret exists and a fortiorip is a Nash equilibrium.
We conclude by proving Theorem 5.7(4). Letp be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). By Theorems 5.6 and 5.8, a realization ofp is with probability 1 a superstrong equilibrium, and so a fortiorip is a super-strong Nash equilibrium.
A.3.2. Proofs and Additional Results for Section 5.1.2 LEMMA A.16. Lett ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy profile, let h ∈ arg Max j∈Pn t j and let k ∈ P n . Ift is not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ), but nonetheless t k is a best response tot −k , then both h (t) < k (t) and µ [t k , t h ) ≥ µ(T ) n . PROOF. As t k is a best response tot −k and by Corollary A.11, k (t) ≥ µ(T ) n . Ast is not a Nash equilibrium, by Corollary A.15 we have h (t) < µ(T ) n , and so h (t) < µ(T ) n ≤ k (t). Therefore, in any mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ;t), no consumer with type d ≥ t h consumes a positive amount from producer k, and so
n , as required. Definition A.17. Lett ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy profile in (n, µ, C ).
-For every q ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we define
-We define M (t) Max q ∈ {0, . . . , n} Q q (t) = ∅ . Remark A.18.
-Q q (t) 0≤q≤n is a partition of P n .
-When the CDF of µ is continuous and strictly increasing, then Q 0 (t) is the set of producers with strategy 0, while Q q (t) for 0 < q ≤ n is the set of producers whose strategies lie in the q th 1 /n of T (as measured by µ), i.e. above the (q − 1) th n-tile yet not above the q th n-tile; for such a CDF, M (t) is the index of the 1 /n of T containing the numerically-largest strategy (or 0 is all strategies are 0), i.e. it is the index of the lowest n-tile above which no strategies lie. LEMMA A.19. Lett ∈ T Pn and let t k be a best response tot −k . Ift is not a Nash equilibrium, then
PROOF. Let h ∈ arg Max j∈Pn t j , wheret −k t −k . We consider two cases. If (t −k , t k ) is not a Nash equilibrium, then by Lemma A.16 we have
n , and so
is a Nash equilibrium whilet is not. Therefore, by Theorem 5.5, there exists ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} s.t.
n · µ(T ), we thus have < M (t), and so
is not a Nash equilibrium, then all of the following hold.
( 
in particular, k = h. By anonymity and by Lemma A.8 
It is enough to consider the scenario in which k ∈ P i , and to show that under this condition,
Once again, we consider two cases. If t i k is not a best response tot i −k , then by definition of δ-better-response dynamics and by Lemma A.13(1), t i+1 k 
rounds within which a Nash equilibrium is not reached. Therefore, if a Nash equilibrium is not reached in at most n · µ(T ) δn rounds from 0, then M (t i ) = 0 and sot i ≡ 0, which by Theorem 5.5 is a Nash equilibrium. Ift i is a Nash equilibrium, then by Theorem 5.5, M (t i+1 ) ≤ n − 1, and so if a Nash equilibrium is not reached in at most (n − 1) · µ(T ) δn rounds from i + 1, then we have M = 0 once more, and so a Nash equilibrium is reached again.
The tighter bounds described in Remark 5.16 may be shown in a similar manner, due to Remark A.21. . Let k ∈ P n and lett ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). We say thatt is in k-canonical form if all of the following hold.
Definition
LEMMA A.23. Let k ∈ P n and lett ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). There exists a permutation π ∈ P n ! s.t.
PROOF. We start by defining π such that t π(0) ≤ t π(1) ≤ · · · ≤ t π(n−1) . In particular, we have
By Theorem 5.5, we have that
for every j ∈ P n , and in particular for every j < π
, then π is a permutation as required. Otherwise, we have
In this case, we modify π to create a new permutation π ∈ P n ! by incrementing π −1 (k), or more formally -by swapping the values of coordinates π −1 (k) and π −1 (k) + 1 of π. We note that Eq. (1) still holds w.r.t. π (i.e. by substituting π for π). By Eq. (2) w.r.t. π for all j < π −1 (k), we have that Eq. (2) holds w.r.t. π for all j < π −1 (k) − 1; by Eq. (3) w.r.t. π, we have that Eq. (2) holds w.r.t.
, then π is a permutation as required. Otherwise, Eq. (3) holds w.r.t. π , and we repeat the modification step. As π −1 (k) is incremented in each modification step, this process concludes in at most n − 1 steps, as it concludes if π −1 (k) reaches n − 1.
LEMMA A.24. Let k ∈ P n and lett ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ) in k-canonical form. Both of the following hold.
( PROOF. By definition of k-canonical form, µ [0, t j ) ≤ j n for every j < k. By definition of k-canonical form, we also have for every n > j > k that µ [0,
. Furthermore, we obtain that (t k+1 , t k+2 , . . . , t n−1 ) are the n − k − 1 numerically-largest strategies int, and as they are sorted, by Theorem 5.5 we have that µ [0, t j ) ≤ j n ·µ(T ) for every j > k as well and the proof of Part 1 is complete. Assume that k < n − 1. As we have shown that
, we have that t k < t k+1 and Part 2 holds. We conclude by proving Part 3; let t ∈ T . If µ [0, t) ≤ k n , then by Part 1 and Theorem 5.5, (t −k , t) is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ).
as well, then by Theorem 5.5, (t −k , t) is a not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ).
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.18. Lett ∈ T Pn be a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ) and let k ∈ P n . By Lemma A.23, assume w.l.o.g. thatt is in k-canonical form. By Lemma A.24(3) , it is enough to show that each
is not a best response tot −k in (n, µ, C ). If k < n + 1, then by Lemma A.24(2), t k < t k+1 and so, by Lemma A.13 and since µ [0, t k+1 ) > k n · µ(T ), it is enough to consider t k < t k ≤ t k+1 in this case. By definition, for every j ≤ k, we have
and so t k > t j . Let s and s be mixed-consumption Nash equilibria in the k-producer consumer game (µ| ∩[0,t k ) ; t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ) and in the (n−k)-producer game (µ| ∩[t k ,1] ; t k , t k+1 , . . . , t n−1 ), respectively; by abuse of notation, we think of s as s = (s ¬ , s k , s k+1 , . . . , s n−1 ) (s ¬ ≡ 0 by definition of s ) and for each k ≤ j < n define
By Theorem 5.5, (t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ) is therefore a Nash equilibrium in (k, µ| ∩[0,t k ) , C ), and so by Theorem 5.4 we have
n for every 0 ≤ j < k. For every k < j < n, we have by Lemma A.24(1) that
and therefore
trivially holds as well. By Theorem 5.5, (t k , t k+1 , t k+2 , . . . , t n−1 ) is therefore a Nash equilibrium in (n − k, µ| ∩[t k ,1] , C ), and so by Theorem 5.4 we have that
n for every k ≤ j < n. Let s be the mixed-consumption profile defined by s j | [0,t k ) = s j for every j ∈ {¬, 0, 1, . . . , k − 1} and s j | [0,t k ) ≡ 0 for every k ≤ j < n, and by s j | [t k ,1] = s j for every k ≤ j < n and s j | [t k ,1] ≡ 0 for every j ∈ {¬, 0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. By definition of s and of s , we have that s is a legal mixed-consumption profile in (µ;t −k , t k ), and furthermore, that
for every j ∈ {¬, 0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, and that
for every k ≤ j < n. By the former, and as s is a Nash equilibrium, no type d ∈ [0, t k ) Discussion Paper 663, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, March 29, 2014. has any incentive to deviate from s in (µ;t −k , t k ), and by the latter, as s is a Nash equilibrium and as
, we have that neither does any type d ∈
(with the last equality by Theorem 5.4, sincet is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C )), we have that producer k strictly prefers t k over t k givent −k , and so t k is not a best response tot −k in (n, µ, C ), as required.
We note that an alternative proof may also be given via Algorithm 1 / Corollary A.6.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5.19 . A direct corollary of Theorems 5.15 and 5.18 and Remark 5.17.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.20 . It is enough to show that some nonequilibrium can be reached in a finite number of steps from any Nash equilibrium. Let t ∈ T s.t. 0 < µ [0, t) ≤ n−1 n ·µ(T ) (there must exist such t by definition of µ) and let j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} be minimal s.t.
By Theorem 5.3, 0 ∈ T is a best-response by any producer to any Nash equilibrium, and so a (nonlazy) best-response dynamic can reach (0, 0, . . . , 0) from any Nash equilibrium in one round. Let i ∈ N be more than one round into the future after reaching (0, 0, . . . , 0), s.t. |P i | > 1, and let k, h ∈ P i s.t. k = h. By definition of t and j and by Theorem 5.5, any strategy profile in which at most n − j producers play t and the rest play 0 is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, within one round after reaching (0, 0, . . . , 0), a Nash equilibrium in which j + 1 producers, including k and h, play 0 and the rest play t, can be reached, and can be lazily maintained until the step i. In step i, all triggered producers may play t ∈ T , which is a best response for each of them since at least j producers playing 0 and the rest playing t is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, and as k and h both switch from playing 0 to playing t at i, at least n − j + 1 producers play t at i + 1, which, by definition of j and by Theorem 5.5, is a nonequilibrium.
LEMMA A.25.
PROOF. By Lemma A.13, all strategies t ∈ T for which µ( [0, t) = 0 are equivalent. As in particular, t = 0 ∈ T is such a strategy, it is therefore enough to show that k strictly prefers to play 0 ∈ T over any t k s.t. µ [0, t k ) > 0. By Lemma A.13(1), it is enough to consider the case in which t k ≤ t j for all j ∈ P n \ {k}. By Algorithm 1 (for
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.22. As in the proof of Theorem 5.15, and as a best-response dynamic is also a µ(T )-better-response dynamic, we have that M (t 0 ) ≤ n (and M ≤ n − 1 on every step immediately following a Nash equilibrium), and that M decreases by at least 1 every round if a Nash equilibrium is not reached.
is not a Nash equilibrium; it is enough to show thatt i is a Nash equilibrium.
Since M (t i ) = 1, by Theorem 5.5 it is enough to show that there exists j ∈ P n s.t.
is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists at most one producer k ∈ P n s.t. µ [0, t i−1 k ) = 0. If there exists no such producer, then by Lemma A.25, we have µ [0, t i j ) = 0 for every j ∈ P i , and as P i = ∅, the proof is complete. Otherwise, there exists a unique k ∈ P n s.t. µ [0, t LEMMA A.26 (DOMINATION). Let t = t ∈ T be strategies in (n, µ, F ). t is a safe alternative to t iff either of the following hold. In either case, t strongly dominates t
PROOF. t is a safe alternative to (alternatively, strongly dominates) t iff either t always produces greater load than t , or t always produces at least as much load as t and in addition t > t . By Lemma A.13(3), the former occurs iff
; by Lemma A.13(1,2), if t > t , then the latter occurs iff µ [t , t) = 0
m and the proof is complete; assume, therefore, that U = ∅ and let u inf U ≥ 0. By definition, U is connected, and therefore by definition of U and u, we have that either
, then u ∈ U , and by definition of U , we obtain µ(U ) = µ [u, t ) ≤ m, as required; assume therefore, that U = (u, t ). In this case,
, and by continuity of µ from below, we obtain µ(U ) ≤ m, as required.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.27. Let t ∈ T be a dominant strategy in this game. By Lemma A.26, both µ [0, t) = 0 (as t is a safe alternative to 0) and µ [t , 1] < µ([t,1]) n for every t > t (as t is a safe alternative to every such t ). (Alternatively, the former holds as by definition, any strategy dominant w.r.t. fine preferences is also dominant w.r.t. coarse preferences, and by Theorem 5.3.) By the former, µ [t, 1] = µ(T ), and therefore and by the latter, µ [t , 1] < µ(T ) n for every t ∈ (t, 1) ∩ Q. Therefore, by continuity of
(Conversely, by Lemma A.26, it is easy to see that if there indeed exists t ∈ T s.t. µ [0, t) = 0 and
n for every t > t, then it constitutes the unique dominant strategy.) For the second statement, we note that by Lemma A.26, the set of dominated strategies is
By σ-additivity of µ and by Lemma A.27 (applied twice), 
We note that this bound is attained if µ is atomless, as in this case it is straightforward to verify that µ
n . The second statement leads to an extremely concise, yet somewhat more obscure, proof for the first one. If a dominant strategy exists, then it is a safe alternative to all other strategies; in particular, all other strategies have safe alternatives (other than themselves). By the second statement, at least n−1 n of µ is therefore concentrated on this dominated strategy, and the proof is complete.
LEMMA A.28. t ∈ T | µ [t , t) ≤ m attains a maximum value for every t ∈ T and m ∈ R ≥ .
PROOF. Denote S t ∈ T | µ [t , t) ≤ m . We note that t ∈ S. If t = sup S, then t = Max S and the proof is complete. Assume, therefore, that t < sup S. Let
By definition of U and of u, we have U = [t , u) . By definition of U and of S, we have that u = sup U = sup S, and so it is enough to show that u ∈ S, i.e. that µ [t , u) ≤ m. As U = [t , u), this is equivalent to showing that µ(U ) ≤ m. Observe that
By continuity of µ from below, we thus obtain µ(U ) ≤ m, as required.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.28. For every j ∈ P n , let t j Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) ≤ j n · µ(T ) . (t j is well-defined by Lemma A.28.) By Theorem 5.5,t is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ), and so by Theorem 5.4, j (t) = µ(T ) n for every j ∈ P n . We now first show that no Nash equilibrium other thant (up to permutations) exists in (n, µ, F ), and then show thatt (and hence all permutations thereof) is a super strong Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ).
Let t 0 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 ∈ T s.t.t is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ). We will show that t j = t j for every j ∈ P n . By definition of coarse and fine preferences,t is also a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). Therefore, by Theorem 5.5 we have that µ [0, t j ) ≤ j n · µ(T ) for every j ∈ P n . Hence we have for every j ∈ P n both that t j ≤ t j and (by Theorem 5.5 again) that (t −j , t j ) is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ) as well. Therefore,
Ast is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ), we therefore have that t j ≥ t j , and so t j = t j , as required.
We now show thatt is a super strong Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ). Assume for contradiction that there exists a coalition P ⊆ P n and strategiest = (t j ) j∈P ∈ T P s.t. j weakly prefers (t −P ,t ) overt w.r.t. fine preferences for every j ∈ P , with a strict preference for at least one producer j ∈ P . For every j ∈ P , as j weakly prefers (t −P ,t ) overt, we have that j (t −P ,t ) ≥ j (t). Ast is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ), by Theorem 5.6, we therefore have j (t −P ,t ) = j (t) for every j ∈ P . Therefore, by definition Discussion Paper 663, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, March 29, 2014. of P andt , we have t j ≥ t j for every j ∈ P , with a strict inequality for at least one producer j ∈ P -let j be such a producer for which t j is greatest. Assume w.l.o.g. that either j = n − 1 or t j < t j+1 ; therefore,t is in j-canonical form. Ast is also a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ), by Theorem 5.18, by Lemma A.24(3) , by definition of t j , and as t j > t j , we have j (t) > j (t −j , t j ). By Lemma A.8 and by definition of j, we have
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5.29. Since the CDF of µ is continuous and strictly increasing, for every j ∈ P n there exists a unique strategy t j ∈ T s.t. µ [0, t j ) = j n ·µ(T ); hence, t j = Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) ≤ j n · µ(T ) and by Theorem 5.28 the proof is complete. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.30. Direct from definition of (n, µ, F ), as no player is ever indifferent between any two strategies, regardless of the information such player possesses regarding the strategies of the other players.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.31. By Theorem 5.28, for every j ∈ P n we have
Therefore, it is enough to show that s j (d) = 1 for almost all d ∈ [t j , t j+1 ). By definition of s, this is equivalent to showing that [tj ,tj+1) s j dµ = µ [t j , t j+1 ) for every j ∈ P n , where t n 1. As µ is atomless, by Theorem 5.28 and by definition of t n we have
for every j ∈ P n . We prove the theorem by induction on j. Let k ∈ P n and assume that the theorem holds for every 0 ≤ j < k; we now show that it holds for j = k as well.
For every 0 ≤ j < k, by the induction hypothesis, [tj ,tj+1) 
n . By Theorem 5.28 and by definition of j (t) and of
and so [t k ,t k+1 ) s j dµ = 0. By definition of Nash equilibrium, s ¬ (d) = 0 for every d ≥ t k , and therefore [t k ,t k+1 ) s ¬ dµ = 0 as well. Let S k {¬, 0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}; by definition of
and the proof by induction is complete. 
Observe that S = ∅ as 0 ∈ S (given by t = 0); let m sup S. By Lemma A.13(1), every t ∈ T s.t. µ [0, t) < m maximizes j (t −j , t), while every that the set of load-maximizing strategies for j is precisely t ∈ T µ [0, t) ≤ m . By Lemma A.28, this set attains a maximum value. As by definition we have that a best response in (n, µ, F ) is a numerically-largest load-maximizing response, we obtain that this maximum value is a best response as required. Uniqueness follows directly from definition of fine preferences.
Before constructively proving Proposition 5.34, we first constructively prove it for two special cases. COROLLARY A.29 (PROPOSITION 5.34 -SPECIAL CASE: LARGE STRATEGIES). Let k ∈ P n , and lett −k ∈ T
Pn\{k}
. If µ [0, t j ) > 0 for all j ∈ P n \ {k}, then the unique best response (by k) tot −k in (n, µ, F ) is Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) = 0 . PROOF. A direct corollary of Lemma A.25, as a best response in (n, µ, F ) is a numerically-largest load-maximizing response; the specified strategy is well defined by Lemma A.28. LEMMA A.30 (PROPOSITION 5.34 -SPECIAL CASE: COARSE EQUILIBRIUM). Let t ∈ T Pn be a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ). For every j ∈ P n , a best response (by j) tō t −j exists in (n, µ, F ).
PROOF (CONSTRUCTIVE)
. By Lemma A.23, assume w.l.o.g. thatt is in j-canonical form. We will show that a best response as required is given by t j Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) ≤ j n · µ(T ) . (t j is well defined by Lemma A.28.) By Lemma A.24(3) and by Theorem 5.18, a strategy t ∈ T maximizes j (t −j , t) iff µ [0, t) ≤ j n · µ(T ). As by definition we have that a best response in (n, µ, F ) is a numerically-largest loadmaximizing response, we obtain that t j is a best response as required.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.34 (CONSTRUCTIVE). W.l.o.g. we prove the result for j = 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ · · · ≤ t n−1 . Uniqueness follows directly from definition of fine preferences; it is therefore enough to show that a best response exists. If µ [0, t 1 ) > 0, then by Corollary A.29 a best response exists as required. Assume therefore henceforth that µ [0, t 1 ) = 0. If (t −0 , 0) is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ), then by Lemma A.30 a best response exists as required. Assume therefore henceforth that (t −0 , 0) is not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ).
Let k ∈ P n be minimal s.t. k (t −0 , 0) < 0 (t −0 , 0). (Such k exists by Corollary A.15, since (t −0 , 0) is not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, C ); by definition, k > 0.) By definition of k and by Corollary A.4 and Lemma A.14, (0, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−1 ) is a Nash equilibrium in (k, µ| ∩[0,t k ) , C ). By Lemma A.30, there exists a best response t 0 ∈ T to (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−1 ) in (k, µ| ∩[0,t k ) , F ). We claim that t 0 is a best response tot −0 in (n, µ, F ) as well.
As k (t −0 , 0) < 0 (t −0 , 0), we have that 0 (t −0 , 0) ≤ µ [0, t k ) , and in particular µ [0, t k ) > 0. Therefore, by Lemma A.13(3) and by definition of t 0 , we obtain t 0 < t k . By Theorem 5.18, (t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t k−1 ) is also a Nash equilibrium in (k, µ| ∩[0,t k ) , C ). Therefore, by Theorem 5.4, j (µ| ∩[0,t k ) ; 0, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−1 ) = µ([0,t k )) k = j (µ| ∩[0,t k ) ; t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t k−1 ) for every j ∈ P k . By the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.10 and as t 0 < t k , therefore j (t) = j (t −0 , 0) for every j ∈ P n . By Corollary A.4 and by definition of k, we have j (t) = j (t −0 , 0) = j (µ| ∩[0,t k ) ; 0, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−1 ) = µ([0,t k )) k for every j ∈ P k . As 0 (t) = 0 (t −0 , 0), by Theorem 5.3 we have that t 0 maximizes the load on producer 0 in (n, µ, F ). Let h ∈ P k s.t. t h ≤ t 0 < t h+1 . Such h > 0 exists as µ [0, t 1 ) = 0 and since t 0 ≥ Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) = 0 ≥ t 1 by Lemma A.13 (this maximum value is attained by Lemma A.28), and h < k since t 0 < t k . It remains to show that every t 0 ∈ (t 0 , 1]) does not maximize the load on producer 0 in (n, µ, F ). By Lemma A.13(1), it is enough to consider the case t 0 < t 0 < t h+1 . Note that t k > t 0 ≥ t 1 and so k > 1. By definition of t 0 and t 0 , we have that t 0 does not maximize the load on producer 0 in (k, µ| ∩[0,t k ) , F ). By Corollary A.4 and by Corollary A.15 (since µ [0, t 1 ) = 0), 1 (t −0 , t 0 ) ≥ 1 (µ| ∩[0,t k ) ; t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t k−1 ) > µ([0,t k )) k = 1 (t), and so by Algorithm 1, 1 (t −0 , t 0 ) = µ([0,t 0 )) h and so j (t −0 , t 0 ) = µ([0,t 0 )) h for every 0 < j ≤ h, and in particular for j = h. Therefore, and by Lemma A.13(1), h (t −0 , t 0 ) = 1 (t −0 , t 0 ) > 1 (t) = 0 (t) ≥ 0 (t −0 , t 0 ). As PROOF OF THEOREM 5.36. Let (t 0 , P i ) ∞ i=0 be a sequential δ-better-response dynamic in (n, µ, F ) s.t.t 0 is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ, C ). Let k ∈ P n and let ı be minimal s.t. k ∈ Pĩ. It is enough to show that t i k is constant for i >ĩ, as this implies that after one roundt i is constant regardless of P i , and is thus a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ, F ).
By Theorem 5.18,t i is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ, C ) for every i ∈ N; therefore, by Theorem 5.4, the loads on all producers are constant throughout this dynamic. Therefore, by definition of δ-better-response dynamics, we have both that (t 0 , P i ) ∞ i=0 is a best-response dynamic in (n, µ, F ), and that (t i j ) ∞ i=0 is monotone-nondecreasing for every j ∈ P n . Let i >ĩ s.t. k ∈ P i . As t PROOF OF THEOREM 7.1. The fact that each such strategy profile is a super-strong equilibrium with load˜ g j on each producer j ∈ P ng of good g ∈ {1, 2} (and with the market allocated between the producers of each good as in the one-good scenario of Section 6) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6.2; we therefore show that no other super-strong equilibrium exists. We give a proof for atomless µ; the proof for general µ is similar and is left to the reader. Let (t We begin by noting that a producer j ∈ P ng of good g ∈ {1, 2} may still secure a load of at least˜ g j by choosing the origin as its location, and so g j ≥˜ g j for every g ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ P ng . As for every g ∈ {1, 2}, we have j∈Pn g g j ≤ µ(T ) = j∈Pn g˜ g j , we have that g j =˜ g j for every j ∈ P ng , i.e. the load on every producer is as in the super-strong equilibria described in the statement of the theorem.
For every g ∈ {1, 2}, let π g ∈ P ng ! be a permutation s.t. t g πg(0) ≤ t g πg(1) ≤ · · · ≤ t g πg(n−1) . For every g ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ P n , define m g j j−1 k=0˜ g πg(k) ; by the genericity assumption on partial sums of producer-equilibrium loads, and by positivity of equilibrium loads, we have m 1 j = m 2 k for every j ∈ P n1 and k ∈ P n2 s.t. either j > 0 or k > 0. As for every j ∈ P ng , the distance t g πg(j) is accessible by at least all consumer types consuming a positive amount from any of the producers π g (j), π g (j + 1), . . . , π g (n − 1) of good g, we have that µ [0, t g π(j) ) ≤ j−1 k=0˜ g πg(k) = m g j for every j ∈ P ng . Therefore, deviating to a super-strong equilibrium as in the statement of the theorem, while maintaining the order of distances from the origin among producers of the same good, harms no producer. If t g πg(j) < Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) ≤ m g j for some g ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ P ng , then producer π g (j) of load g strictly benefits from such a deviation; therefore, t g πg(j) = Max t ∈ T | µ [0, t) ≤ m g j for every g ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ P ng . Therefore, as µ is atomless, the market allocated between the producers of each good as in the one-good scenario of Section 6.
Assume for contradiction that not all producer strategies in (t same ray from the origin. Therefore, w.l.o.g. there exist producers j ∈ P n1 and k ∈ P n2 whose strategies do not lie on the same ray, s.t. t 2 ) can consume from both producer j of good 1 and producer k of good 2 without violating the consumer's QoS limit. By combining these two, we have that for δ min We note that the requirements in Theorem 7.1, both for every producer-equilibrium load to be positive and for the genericity of partial sums of producer-equilibrium loads, are required. Indeed, any producer with zero producer-equilibrium load can be moved to any ray without destabilizing the equilibrium. Furthermore, if there exist permutations π 1 ∈ P n1 ! and π 2 ∈ P n2 ! and producers j ∈ P n1 \ {0} and k ∈ P n2 \ {0} s.t. , then moving all producers j of good 1 s.t. π 1 (j ) ≥ π 1 (j) and all producers k of good 2 s.t. π 2 (k ) ≥ π 2 (k) together to any ray does not destabilize the equilibrium either.
